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Abstract: 
Thinking of government as entrepreneur is a unique lens through which to view a subset of 
government actions. The lens is not a template for an evaluation of government policy; rather, it 
is a characterization that underscores the government's purposeful intent, ability to act in new 
and innovative ways, and willingness to undertake policy actions that have uncertain outcomes. 
Our focus is on the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. We argue that the 
innovative action of government – the innovative use of public resources through the SBIR 
program to target and support research in small firms – does lessen innovation barriers that cause 
small firms to underinvest in R&D. However, this government action is subject to 
entrepreneurial risk, namely the a priori uncertainty that the funded research will result in a 
commercialized product, process, or service. We quantify the uncertainty that the government 
accepts in the context of innovation supported by the SBIR program; or stated alternatively, we 
quantify the probability that a project funded by the SBIR program will fail to commercialize its 
results. Our empirical results show that the entrepreneurial risk that characterizes the SBIR 
program is, on average, somewhat more than the probability of failing to get heads on the toss of 
a fair coin. Importantly, however, our evidence shows that there is a large range in the 
entrepreneurial risk that the government accepts—across the projects, the predicted probability 
of failure covers essentially the entire range from 0 to 1.0. 
 government entrepreneur | small business innovation research | research and Keywords:
development | research policy | economics | entrepreneurship 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
Government, the aggregation of public-sector agents, acts as entrepreneur in the provision of 
technology infrastructure when its involvement in the overall process of technological change is 
both innovative and characterized by entrepreneurial risk (i.e., uncertainty). Government, 
primarily at the national level, provides technology infrastructure through public and quasi-
public institutions, as well as through public and quasi-public goods and services that leverage 
the innovation process. Through its actions providing technology infrastructure, government 
supports mechanisms, institutions, and platforms to lessen innovation barriers that cause market 
failure for investments in all stages of technology-based economic activity. Furthermore, 
government supports the design, deployment, and use of both individual technology-based 
component goods and the systems of such component goods that enhance a knowledge-based 
economy. Government is also involved in the provision of services that leverage innovation by 
making private sector R&D more effective. By perceiving opportunity and acting on that 
perception to provide such technology infrastructure – institutions, goods, and services – and 
assuming the entrepreneurial risk associated with providing it, government acts as entrepreneur.2 
Our conceptualization of government as entrepreneur – providing technology infrastructure when 
its involvement is both innovative and characterized by entrepreneurial risk – draws from the 
intellectual thought of Cantillon, who built upon his idea that the entrepreneur is an agent of 
innovation who assumes the risk associated with uncertainty – entrepreneurial risk – and 
Baudeau and Schumpeter, who fostered the idea that the entrepreneur is one who innovates, 
creatively as opposed to adaptively, and applies new techniques. In Section 2, we briefly review 
key ideas from these writers. 
 
Thinking of government as entrepreneur is a unique lens through which to view a subset – 
clearly not all government endeavors are entrepreneurial – of government actions. The lens is not 
a template for an evaluation of government policy; rather, it is a characterization that underscores 
the government's purposeful intent, ability to act in new and innovative ways, and willingness to 
undertake policy actions that have uncertain outcomes. 
 
Building on the arguments of Link and Link (2009), we do not take the position, much less 
advocate, that government should be more or less entrepreneurial. Rather, we argue that a new 
aspect of a taxonomy of government policy actions should be considered, and we are sanguine 
about its usefulness. Viewing particular policy actions through an entrepreneurial lens could be 
useful in at least two broad dimensions. First, viewing particular government policy actions – the 
U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the case of this paper – as 
entrepreneurial underscores the forward looking nature of policies as well as the need to evaluate 
their social outputs and outcomes in terms of broad spillover impacts. And second, the concept 
of government as entrepreneur emphasizes parallels between the government's policies and 
similar activities that occur in the private sector. Baumol et al. (2007, p. 2) recently suggested 
that: “if the United States wishes to continue enjoying rapid growth, it must find a way both to 
launch and promote the growth of innovative entrepreneurial enterprises…” Viewing 
government as entrepreneur, albeit in selected areas and for selected policies, measures the 
government's entrepreneurial activities against the reality of technological change because it 
compares entrepreneurial government policy actions with the analogous private sector activities 
that have led to economic growth and prosperity in all industrial nations. 
 
In Section 3, we review the public institution, the SBIR program, that is the focus of this paper, 
and we argue that the innovative action of government – the innovative use of public resources 
through the SBIR program to target and support research in small firms – does lessen innovation 
barriers that cause small firms to underinvest in R&D. However, this government action is 
subject to entrepreneurial risk, namely the a priori uncertainty that the funded research will result 
in a commercialized product, process or service. 
 
The remainder of this paper is an empirical analysis of the commercialization success of SBIR-
funded projects. The empirical analysis quantifies the level of entrepreneurial risk that 
characterizes the SBIR program. In Section 4 we provide an overview of the data we use to 
estimate the probability of commercialization of an SBIR-funded research project. In Section 5 
we report and discuss our empirical findings. We conclude in Section 6 with a restatement of our 
view of government as entrepreneur and our conclusion that the SBIR program is characterized 
by entrepreneurial risk. We also discuss the interpretative limitations of the paper and set forth an 
agenda for future empirical research in this area. 
 
2. Intellectual thought underlying government as entrepreneur3 
Cantillon (1680–1734) is associated with the view that the entrepreneur is one who deals with 
the business risks resulting because individuals do not have perfect foresight. Cantillon (1931) 
depicted the entrepreneur as one who exercises business judgment in the face of uncertainty. 
Cantillon took uncertainty for granted as something inherent in the economic activity of the 
marketplace. Although he did not provide a detailed analysis of the nature of risk and 
uncertainty, he did relate the function of the entrepreneur to uncertainty.4 Cantillon argued that 
the origin of the entrepreneur lies in individuals’ lack of perfect foresight. Uncertainty is a 
pervasive fact of everyday life, and those who must deal with it continually in their economic 
decisions are entrepreneurs. Consequently, it is the function of the entrepreneur, not his/her 
personality, which counts for economic analysis. Cantillon was quite emphatic that this function 
lies at the very heart of a market system, and that without it, the market as we know it, does not 
operate. 
 
Baudeau (1730–1792) and Schumpeter (1883–1950) are among those who emphasized the 
innovative nature of the entrepreneur. Baudeau (1910) treated the agricultural entrepreneur as a 
risk bearer, in the manner of Cantillon (i.e., the view of the entrepreneur facing general business 
uncertainty), but he added a distinctive twist. He made the entrepreneur an innovator as well, one 
who invents and applies new techniques or ideas in order to reduce his costs and thereby raise his 
profit. This new aspect of entrepreneurship, innovation, represents an important advance over 
Cantillon's theory because it anticipated the 20th-century reformulation of entrepreneurship by 
Schumpeter. 
 
The entrepreneur is the key figure for Schumpeter because, quite simply, he is the persona causa 
of economic development. For Schumpeter, the main instrument of change in a theory of 
economic development is the entrepreneur. Development is a dynamic process, a disturbing of 
the economic status quo.5 The leadership that constitutes innovation in the Schumpeterian sense 
is not homogeneous. An aptitude for leadership stems in part from the use of knowledge, and 
knowledge has aspects of a public good. People of action who perceive and react to knowledge 
do so in various ways; each internalizes the public good in potentially a different way. 
Schumpeter's entrepreneurial leader is distinct from a manager. According to Schumpeter (1928, 
p. 380), different aptitudes for the routine work of “static” management result merely in 
differential success at what all managers do, where different leadership aptitudes mean that 
“some are able to undertake uncertainties incident to what has not been done before; [indeed] … 
to overcome these difficulties incident to change of practice is the function of the entrepreneur.” 
 
3. The SBIR program 
In the following description of the SBIR program, we argue that government acts as entrepreneur 
by leading in accepting innovative risks in circumstances where the private sector would not do 
the entrepreneurial action even though it would be socially beneficial. The SBIR program is a 
public/private partnership that provides grants to fund private sector R&D projects. It aims to 
help fulfill the government's mission to enhance private sector R&D and to complement the 
results of Federal research.6 A prototype of the SBIR program began at the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) in 1977 (Tibbetts, 1999). At that time, the goal of the program was to 
encourage small businesses – increasingly recognized to be a source of innovation and 
employment in the U.S. economy – to participate in NSF-sponsored research, especially research 
with commercial potential. Because of the early success of the program at NSF, Congress passed 
the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-219; hereafter, the 1982 
Act).7 
 
The 1982 Act required all government departments and agencies with external research programs 
of greater than $100 million to establish their own SBIR program and to set aside funds equal to 
0.20% of the external research budget.8 In 1983, this amount totaled $45 million. 
 
The 1982 Act stated that the objectives of the program are: 
 
(1) 
to stimulate technological innovation, 
(2) 
to use small business to meet Federal research and development needs, 
(3) 
to foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological 
innovation, and 
(4) 
to increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal research and 
development. 
As part of the 1982 Act, SBIR program awards were structured as defined by three phases 
(National Research Council, 2004).9 Phase I awards are small, less than $50,000 for the 6-month 
award period in the program's early years.10 The purpose of Phase I awards is to assist 
businesses as they assess the feasibility of an idea's scientific and commercial potential in 
response to the funding agency's objectives.11 Phase II awards were capped at $500,000; they 
generally lasted for 2 years. These awards are for the business to develop further its proposed 
research, ideally leading to a commercializable product, process, or service.12 The Phase II 
awards of public funds for development are sometimes augmented by outside private funding 
(Wessner, 2000). Further work on the projects launched through the SBIR program occurs in 
what is called Phase III, which does not involve SBIR funds.13 At this stage, businesses needing 
additional financing – to ensure that the product, process, or service can move into the 
marketplace – are expected to obtain it from sources other than the SBIR program. 
 
In 1986, the 1982 Act was extended through 1992 (P.L. 99-443). In 1992, the SBIR program was 
reauthorized again until 2000 through the Small Business Research and Development Enactment 
Act (P.L. 102-564). Under the 1982 Act, the set aside had increased to 1.25%; the 1992 
reauthorization raised that amount over time to 2.50% and re-emphasized the commercialization 
intent of SBIR-funded technologies (see point (4) of the 1982 Act above).14 The reauthorization 
also increased Phase I awards to $100,000 and Phase II awards to $750,000.15 The 1992 
reauthorization broadened objective (3) above to focus also on women: “to provide for enhanced 
outreach efforts to increase the participation of … small businesses that are 51% owned and 
controlled by women.” The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554) 
extended the SBIR program until September 30, 2008, kept the 2.50% set aside, and did not 
increase the amounts of Phase I and Phase II awards.16 
 
Congress did not reauthorize the SBIR program by September 30, 2008; rather, it temporarily 
extended the program until March 20, 2009 (P.L. 110-235). The Senate version of the 
reauthorization bill, S. 3029, included among other things an increase in Phase I funding to 
$150,000 and an increase in Phase II funding to $1,000,000 with provisions for these funding 
guidelines to be exceeded by 50%. Also, the current 2.5% set aside would increase to 3.5% at a 
rate of 0.1% per year over 10 years, except for the National Institutes of Health which would stay 
at 2.5%. On March 19, the House and Senate reauthorized the SBIR program until July 31, 2009 
(P.L. 110-10); it was again reauthorized through September 30, 2009 through a Senate 
continuing resolution (S. 1513); on September 23, 2009 a House bill (H.R. 3614) extended SBIR 
until October 31, 2009; and finally a Senate bill (S. 1929) again extended the program until April 
30, 2010.17 The issues continue to be whether the existing Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III 
processes should remain, whether the dollar size of Phase I and Phase II awards should be 
changed, and whether venture capitalists should be involved in the SBIR process. 
 
Eleven agencies participate in the SBIR program: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DoC), Defense (DoD), 
Education (ED), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS, particularly the NIH), 
Transportation (DoT), and, most recently, Homeland Security (DHS). In 2005 (the year of the 
survey from which the data analyzed herein come, as discussed below), DoD maintained the 
largest program, awarding about 51% of total dollars and funding about 57% of total awards in 
that year. Five agencies – DoD, HHS, NASA, DOE, and NSF – account for nearly 97% of the 
program's expenditures, with HHS (which includes the NIH) being the second most important, 
accounting for 30% of total dollars and 19% of total awards in 2005 (see Table 1).18 
 
 
 
Table 1. SBIR awards and dollars, FY2005. 
Agency Phase I awards Phase I dollars Phase II awards Phase II dollars Total awards Total dollars 
DoD 2344 $213,482,152 998 $729,285,508 3342 $942,767,660 
HHSa 732 $149,584,038 369 $412,504,975 1101 $562,089,013 
DOE 259 $25,757,637 101 $77,852,565 360 $103,610,202 
NASA 290 $20,183,648 139 $83,014,853 429 $103,198,501 
NSF 152 $15,054,750 132 $64,101,179 284 $79,155,929 
USDA 91 $7,195,211 40 $11,738,536 131 $18,933,747 
DHS 62 $6,158,240 13 $10,241,202 75 $16,399,442 
ED 22 $1,646,603 14 $6,749,980 36 $8,396,583 
DoC 34 $2,373,433 19 $5,469,846 53 $7,843,279 
EPA 38 $2,652,216 14 $3,540,251 52 $6,192,467 
DoT 7 $679,154 3 $1,765,468 10 $2,444,622 
 Total 4031 $444,767,082 1842 $1,406,264,363 5873 $1,851,031,445 
a The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is under the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS). 
The economic role of the SBIR program is illustrated in Fig. 1.19 For project Awithout SBIR, 
the private rate of return is less than the private hurdle rate because of barriers to technology. As 
such, the private firm will not choose to invest in project A, although the social benefits from 
undertaking the project would be great. The vertical distance measured by the distance from 
isocial to the 45-degree line at iprivate for project Awithout SBIR is the spillover gap; it results 
from the additional value society would receive above what the private firm would receive if 
project Awithout SBIR were undertaken. Project Awithout SBIR is precisely the type of project 
in which the public should invest, namely one in which the private sector would not invest 
because of market failure and one from which society would greatly benefit. 
 
Fig. 1. Spillover gap between social and private rates of return to SBIR-funded research. 
In Fig. 2, we alternatively illustrate that reduction in risk in terms of a rightward shift in the 
distribution of the rate of return for the private firms.20 The rightward shift of the distribution, 
and the concept of reducing the probability of returns lower than acceptable to the private 
investors, applies equally well to the absolute level of net return (absolute return minus private 
investment) expected from the project. As shown in Fig. 2, SBIR support increases the firm's 
expected private rate of return and thereby reduces the downside risk associated with 
undertaking R&D.21 For each distribution – without-SBIR funding (left distribution) and with 
SBIR funding (right distribution) – the expected rate of return is shown.22 As drawn, with SBIR 
funding the expected private rate of return and the variance in the private rate of return from the 
research project will increase. One can generalize that this will always be the case.23 
 
Fig. 2. Private risk reduction resulting from SBIR funding. 
Consider the left distribution—the distribution of the rate of return for the private firm without-
SBIR funding. As drawn, the private hurdle rate is to the right of the expected rate of return 
without-SBIR funding, implying that the private firm will not undertake this research because the 
firm will not receive its required rate of return. The risk of the project equals the area under this 
without-SBIR distribution that is to the left of the private hurdle rate. For those used to thinking 
of the variance of the distribution as the measure of risk, the downside risk – which is the 
probability of a rate of return less than the hurdle rate – might seem unusual. Variance measures 
the possibility that outcomes can differ from the expected outcome, while the downside risk 
measures the probability of an outcome departing to the downside of the hurdle rate. Note that 
the technical risk and the market risk for the project are reflected in the variance of the 
distribution—the technical goals may exceed or fall short of expectations and market acceptance 
of the project's technical outcomes could do the same. The downside risk refers to the outcomes 
that fall short of the hurdle rate. 
 
Consider the distribution on the right in Fig. 2—the distribution of the rate of return for the 
private firm with SBIR funding. With SBIR funding, the private firm will expect a return greater 
than its hurdle rate—the expected private rate of return with SBIR funding is drawn to the right 
of the private hurdle rate.24 While SBIR funding will not itself increase the probability that the 
research will be successful, assuming hypothetically that it were undertaken absent SBIR 
funding, it will however reduce private risk by increasing the expected private rate of return 
because the expected rate of return will be based on a smaller private outlay.25 Hence, SBIR 
funding leverages the private firm's investment as illustrated by a greater expected return and a 
greater variance in the distribution as explained above. 
 
The shaded area in Fig. 2 is what we call the downside risk of the project—that is, it is the 
probability that the project will yield a rate of return less than the private hurdle rate even with 
SBIR funding. Hence, the amount of downside risk with SBIR funding is visually less than the 
downside risk associated with the research project in the without-SBIR funding case. 
 
4. The National Research Council Database 
The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000 stated: 
 
[E]ach agency with a budget of more than $50,000,000 for its SBIR program for fiscal 
year 1999, in consultation with the Small Business Administration, shall, not later than 6 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act [December 21, 2000], cooperatively 
enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences for the National 
Research Council to … conduct a comprehensive study of how the SBIR program has 
stimulated technological innovation and used small businesses to meet Federal research 
and development needs… 
 
As part of the National Research Council (NRC) study, a survey-based database was constructed 
(Wessner, 2008). In 2005, the NRC conducted an extensive and balanced survey based on a 
population of 11,214 projects completed from Phase II awards by five agencies: DoD, NIH 
within HHS, NASA, DOE, and NSF. These five agencies accounted for nearly 97% of the 
program's expenditures in 2005 (see Table 1). Only those Phase II awards made between 1992 
and 2001 were in the NRC sample; it was assumed as part of the sampling methodology that 
Phase II awards made in 2001 would be completed by 2005. 
The data reduction in Table 2 shows the number of Phase II projects for which relevant data 
were available, and these are the projects analyzed here, by agency. 
Table 2. Final sample of Phase II projects awarded from 1992 to 2001. 
Data reduction Number of projects 
 
 DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
Population of projects 5650 2497 1488 808 771 
Survey population 3055 1678 779 439 457 
Random survey populationa 3026 1677 775 436 456 
Survey respondents 891 495 177 154 161 
Survey respondents reporting all relevant information 761 388 155 135 136 
a Not all projects selected for the survey were randomly selected. By intent, the NRC added projects because they 
had realized significant commercialization and the NRC wanted to be able to describe for Congress outstanding 
success stories. Only randomly selected projects were included in the econometric analysis discussed. 
According to Wessner (2008, p. 109): “Comparisons between SBIR programs at different 
agencies … must be regarded with considerable caution. … widely differing agency missions 
have shaped the agency SBIR programs, focusing them on different objectives and on different 
mechanisms and approaches.” Accordingly, our analysis of the commercialization success of 
SBIR projects is conducted on an agency by agency basis. We do discuss cross-agency 
differences in our econometric results in the following section, but by doing so we are only 
emphasizing behavioral differences in agency projects; we are not advocating that our findings 
are a motivation for restructuring one agency's program based on results for another agency's 
program. 
 
5. Model of commercialization success and econometric findings 
Our econometric model of the probability of commercialization of an SBIR-funded project 
incorporates all available information from the NRC database. Our intent is to estimate the 
probability of commercialization subject to all available controls. By so doing we argue that we 
are able to calculate the predicted probability of success of an SBIR project that has a given set 
of characteristics using full information and thus make a statement about the a priori uncertainty 
that the funded research will be commercially successful. 
 
The explanatory variables considered in this econometric strategy are divided into four groups as 
shown and defined in Table 3. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4, by agency. 
Table 3. Definitions of the variables in the commercialization models. 
 Definition 
Dependent variable 
 dsales 0/1 with 1 indicating if to date (i.e., 2005) there has been commercialization, 
defined as sales of products, processes, services, rights to the technology, or spin off 
companies; and 0 otherwise 
 Non-SBIR funding variables 
 non-sbir-federal-to-total-
investment 
Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from non-
SBIR federal funds to total investment (including the SBIR Phase II award) in the 
Phase II project 
 U.S.-private-venture-capital-
to-total-investment 
Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from U.S. 
private venture capital investment to total investment (including the SBIR Phase II 
award) in the Phase II project 
 foreign-private-investment-to-
total-investment 
Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from foreign 
private investment to total investment (including the SBIR Phase II award) in the 
Phase II project 
 other-private-equity-
investment-to-total-investment 
Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from other 
private equity investment to total investment (including the SBIR Phase II award) in 
the Phase II project 
 other-domestic-private-firm- Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from other 
domestic private firm investment to total investment (including the SBIR Phase II 
 Definition 
investment-to-total-investment award) in the Phase II project 
 state-or-local-government-
funding-to-total-investment 
Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from state or 
local government funding of investment to total investment (including the SBIR 
Phase II award) in the Phase II project 
 colleges-or-universities-
funding-to-total-investment 
Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from colleges 
or universities funding of investment to total investment (including the SBIR Phase 
II award) in the Phase II project 
 own-firm-funding-to-total-
investment 
Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from the 
SBIR firm's (including borrowed funds) own investment to total investment 
(including the SBIR Phase II award) in the Phase II project 
 personal-funds-to-total-
investment 
Ratio of additional developmental funding during the Phase II project from the 
principals’ investment of personal funds to total investment (including the SBIR 
Phase II award) in the Phase II project 
 prior_sbir_fndg 0/1 with 1 indicating that (excluding the Phase I, which proceeded this Phase II) 
prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from the SBIR for research or 
development of the technology in the Phase II project 
 prior_nonsbir_fed 0/1 with 1 indicating that prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from 
non-SBIR federal R&D for research or development of the technology in the Phase 
II project 
 prior_ventcap 0/1 with 1 indicating that prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from 
venture capital for research or development of the technology in the Phase II project 
 prior_other_priv 0/1 with 1 indicating that prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from 
another private firm for research or development of the technology in the Phase II 
project 
 prior_priv_inv 0/1 with 1 indicating that prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from a 
private investor for research or development of the technology in the Phase II 
project 
 prior_intrnl_co 0/1 with 1 indicating that prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from 
internal company investment (including borrowed money) for research or 
development of the technology in the Phase II project 
 prior_stateorlocal 0/1 with 1 indicating that prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from 
state or local government for research or development of the technology in the 
Phase II project 
 prior_univ_fndg 0/1 with 1 indicating that prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from a 
college or university for research or development of the technology in the Phase II 
project 
 Definition 
 prior_other 0/1 with 1 indicating that prior to the Phase II award, the firm received funds from 
other sources than those specified in the foregoing qualitative variables for research 
or development of the technology in the Phase II project 
 Other Phase II project variables 
 award_amt Amount of the Phase II award 
 ln award_amt Natural logarithm of the amount of the Phase II award 
 prj_age Age of the Phase II project 
 reltd_phII Number of the firm's Phase II awards that are related to the Phase II project as of the 
time that the project was funded 
 ln reltd_phII Natural logarithm of the firm's Phase II awards that are related to the Phase II 
project as of the time that the project was funded 
 nocom 0/1 with 1 indicating no planned commercial use for project's results 
 software 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned to commercialize software 
 hardware 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned to commercialize hardware 
 process 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned to commercialize process technology 
 service 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned to commercialize a service 
 drug 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned to commercialize a drug 
 biologic 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned to commercialize a biologic 
 research 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned to commercialize a research tool 
 education 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned to commercialize educational material 
 other 0/1 with 1 indicating the project planned commercialization not covered in the other 
categories 
 Firm variables 
 firm revenue Firm's total revenue 
 ln revenue Natural logarithm of firm's total revenue 
 sbir_fnd 0/1 with 1 indicating if the firm was founded at least in part because of the SBIR 
program 
 Definition 
 business_fndrs Number of company founders with business backgrounds 
 academic_fndrs Number of company founders with academic backgrounds 
 phII_tprj Number of Phase II awards that the firm had received over time as of the time of the 
project award 
 ln phII_tprj Natural logarithm of the number of Phase II awards that the firm had received over 
time as of the time of the project award 
 late_eval 0/1 with 1 indicating late evaluation of the commercial potential for the Phase II 
project 
 num_svyd Number of the firm's Phase II projects surveyed 
 phII_tsvy Firm's number of Phase II awards that were among the population of 1992–2001 
projects for sampling in the survey 
 ln phII_tsvy Natural logarithm of the firm's number of Phase II awards that were among the 
population of 1992–2001 projects for sampling in the survey 
 sbir_patents Number of patents that have resulted at least in part from the firm's SBIR and/or 
STTR awards 
 sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d Percentage of firm's total R&D effort (man-hours of scientists and engineers) 
devoted to SBIR activities during the most recent fiscal year 
 Geographic variables 
 ne 0/1 with 1 indicating that the firm is in the northeast 
 south 0/1 with 1 indicating that the firm is in the south 
 midwest 0/1 with 1 indicating that the firm is in the midwest 
 west 0/1 with 1 indicating that the firm is in the west 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on variables used in subsequent regression models. 
 DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
 Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 761 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 388 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 155 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 135 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 136 
Dependent variable 
 dsales 0.4560 
(0.4984) [0/1] 
0.4897 
(0.5005) [0/1] 
0.4581 
(0.4999) [0/1] 
0.5259 
(0.5012) [0/1] 
0.4926 
(0.5018) [0/1] 
 Non-SBIR funding variables 
 non-sbir-federal-to-total-
investment 
0.07763 
(0.1840) [0–
0.9869] 
0.02175 
(0.1025) [0–
0.8853] 
0.03892 
(0.1285) [0–
0.7121] 
0.05735 
(0.1580) [0–
0.8897] 
0.07586 
(0.1883) [0–
0.9464] 
 U.S.-private-venture-
capital-to-total-
investment 
0.01620 
(0.1047) [0–
0.9723] 
0.01340 
(0.08470) [0–
0.7778] 
  0.01209 
(0.07542) [0–
0.6723] 
 foreign-private-
investment-to-total-
investment 
0.003598 
(0.03290) [0–
0.4643] 
0.006188 
(0.04094) [0–
0.3843] 
 0.008853 
(0.08406) [0–
0.9535] 
 
 other-private-equity-
investment-to-total-
investment 
0.02019 
(0.09813) [0–
0.8889] 
0.02312 
(0.1008) [0–
0.8532] 
0.003654 
(0.03014) [0–
0.3571] 
0.02109 
(0.08871) [0–
0.4828] 
0.04716 
(0.1531) [0–
0.9091] 
 other-domestic-private-
firm-investment-to-total-
investment 
0.02748 
(0.09828) [0–
0.7834] 
0.01854 
(0.09704) [0–
0.8529] 
0.02364 
(0.08460) [0–
0.4568] 
0.05830 
(0.1425) [0–
0.7696] 
0.05527 
(0.1384) [0–
0.7245] 
 state-or-local-
government-funding-to-
total-investment 
0.004079 
(0.02712) [0–
0.2811] 
0.007909 
(0.04757) [0–
0.6471] 
 0.001953 
(0.01500) [0–
0.1533] 
0.02000 
(0.07640) [0–
0.4778] 
 colleges-or-universities-
funding-to-total-
investment 
0.001048 
(0.01688) [0–
0.4000] 
0.0004175 
(0.003479) 
[0–0.04243] 
   
 own-firm-funding-to-
total-investment 
0.05051 
(0.1218) [0–
0.9474] 
0.08447 
(0.1613) [0–
0.8813] 
0.07886 
(0.1752) [0–
0.8096] 
0.07418 
(0.1534) [0–
0.8571] 
0.06466 
(0.1317) [0–
0.6281] 
 personal-funds-to-total-
investment 
0.007534 
(0.03901) [0–
0.4545] 
0.01879 
(0.06527) [0–
0.5715] 
0.003100 
(0.01796) [0–
0.1799] 
0.004421 
(0.02340) [0–
0.2107] 
0.02787 
(0.08335) [0–
0.5334] 
 DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
 Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 761 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 388 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 155 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 135 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 136 
 prior_sbir_fndg 0.2076 
(0.4059) [0/1] 
0.1469 
(0.3545) [0/1] 
 0.2667 
(0.4439) [0/1] 
0.2132 
(0.4111) [0/1] 
 prior_ventcap 0.02234 
(0.1479) [0/1] 
0.04897 
(0.2161) [0/1] 
 0.02963 
(0.1702) [0/1] 
0.02206 
(0.1474) [0/1] 
 prior_univ_fndg 0.01577 
(0.1247) [0/1] 
0.04124 
(0.1991) [0/1] 
 0.02963 
(0.1702) [0/1] 
0.04412 
(0.2061) [0/1] 
 prior_nonsbir_fed 0.1156 
(0.3200) [0/1] 
0.04897 
(0.2161) [0/1] 
 0.1407 
(0.3490) [0/1] 
0.1471 
(0.3555) [0/1] 
 prior_other_priv 0.08410 
(0.2777) [0/1] 
0.07474 
(0.2633) [0/1] 
 0.08148 
(0.2746) [0/1] 
0.1471 
(0.3555) [0/1] 
 prior_priv_inv 0.06439 
(0.2456) [0/1] 
0.09794 
(0.2976) [0/1] 
 0.04444 
(0.2068) [0/1] 
0.1397 
(0.3480) [0/1] 
 prior_intrnl_co 0.2733 
(0.4460) [0/1] 
0.3273 
(0.4698) [0/1] 
 0.3111 
(0.4647) [0/1] 
0.3529 
(0.4797) [0/1] 
 prior_state_or_local 0.01708 
(0.1297) [0/1] 
0.05928 
(0.2364) [0/1] 
 0.02222 
(0.1480) [0/1] 
0.05882 
(0.2362) [0/1] 
 prior_other 0.04336 
(0.2038) [0/1] 
0.06186 
(0.2412) [0/1] 
 0.02963 
(0.1702) [0/1] 
0.08088 
(0.2737) [0/1] 
 Other Phase II project variables 
 award_amt 719,900.0 
(358,900.0) 
[69,670–
6,191,000] 
654,200.0 
(211,800) 
[14,830–
1,644,000] 
567,200.0 
(73,390.0) 
[350,000–
1,125,000] 
683,300.0 
(104,000.0) 
[347,700–
900,000] 
374,400.0 
(74,880.00) 
[213,300–
500,000] 
 ln award_amt 13.41 (0.3805) 
[11.15–15.64] 
13.32 (0.4268) 
[9.605–14.31] 
13.24 (0.1230) 
[12.77–13.93] 
13.42 (0.1716) 
[12.76–13.71] 
12.81 (0.2043) 
[12.27–13.12] 
 prj_age 7.481 (2.821) 
[4–13] 
7.260 (2.585) 
[4–13] 
8.084 (2.923) 
[4–13] 
7.778 (2.736) 
[4–13] 
6.941 (2.491) 
[4–13] 
 reltd_phII 1.879 (1.632) 
[1–29] 
2.139 (3.396) 
[1–29] 
1.748 (1.527) 
[1–13] 
1.926 (1.637) 
[1–13] 
1.801 (1.387) 
[1–10] 
 ln reltd_phII 0.4372 
(0.5661) [0–
0.4276 
(0.6464) [0–
0.3597 
(0.5577) [0–
0.4294 
(0.6152) [0–
0.3987 
(0.5641) [0–
 DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
 Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 761 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 388 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 155 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 135 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 136 
3.367] 3.367] 2.565] 2.565] 2.303] 
 nocom 0.02102 
(0.1436) [0/1] 
0.01289 
(0.1129) [0/1] 
   
 software 0.2155 
(0.4114) [0/1] 
0.2758 
(0.4475) [0/1] 
0.1419 
(0.3501) [0/1] 
0.1407 
(0.3490) [0/1] 
0.25 (0.4346) 
[0/1] 
 hardware 0.3942 
(0.4890) [0/1] 
0.2577 
(0.4380) [0/1] 
0.4323 
(0.4970) [0/1] 
0.4074 
(0.4932) [0/1] 
0.4044 
(0.4926) [0/1] 
 process 0.1551 
(0.3622) [0/1] 
0.09794 
(0.2976) [0/1] 
0.1355 
(0.3433) [0/1] 
0.2370 
(0.4268) [0/1] 
0.2059 
(0.4058) [0/1] 
 service 0.1196 
(0.3247) [0/1] 
0.1108 
(0.3143) [0/1] 
0.1226 
(0.3290) [0/1] 
0.1556 
(0.3638) [0/1] 
0.1618 
(0.3696) [0/1] 
 drug  0.01546 
(0.1235) [0/1] 
   
 biologic  0.03866 
(0.1930) [0/1] 
   
 research 0.1051 
(0.3069) [0/1] 
0.2603 
(0.4394) [0/1] 
0.1484 
(0.3566) [0/1] 
0.1037 
(0.3060) [0/1] 
0.1618 
(0.3696) [0/1] 
 education 0.01445 
(0.1194) [0/1] 
0.1443 
(0.3519) [0/1] 
0.03226 
(0.1773) [0/1] 
0.02963 
(0.1702) [0/1] 
0.09559 
(0.2951) [0/1] 
 other 0.06176 
(0.2409) [0/1] 
0.07732 
(0.2674) [0/1] 
0.04516 
(0.2083) [0/1] 
0.05926 
(0.2370) [0/1] 
0.05882 
(0.2362) [0/1] 
 Firm variables 
 firm revenue 1.40e+07 
(2.65e+07) 
[50,000–
1.25e+08] 
8,259,000 
(1.92e+07) 
[50,000–
1.25e+08] 
1.64e+07 
(2.93e+07) 
[50,000–
1.25e+08] 
1.10e+07 
(2.17e+07) 
[50,000–
1.25e+08] 
7,214,000 
(1.47e+07) 
[50,000–
6.00e+07] 
 ln revenue 15.02 (1.854) 
[10.82–18.64] 
14.14 (2.010) 
[10.82–18.64] 
15.07 (1.946) 
[10.82–18.64] 
14.72 (1.910) 
[10.82–18.64] 
14.22 (1.974) 
[10.82–17.91] 
 sbir_fnd 0.2181 
(0.4133) [0/1] 
0.2603 
(0.4394) [0/1] 
0.2065 
(0.4061) [0/1] 
0.2519 
(0.4357) [0/1] 
0.2059 
(0.4058) [0/1] 
 DoD NIH NASA DOE NSF 
 Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 761 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 388 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 155 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 135 
Mean (S.D.) 
[range] 
n = 136 
 business_fndrs 0.6899 (1.012) 
[0–8] 
0.6624 (1.463) 
[0–18] 
0.6839 (1.018) 
[0–6] 
0.6444 
(0.9885) [0–5] 
0.7426 
(0.9428) [0–5] 
 academic_fndrs 1.076 (1.277) 
[0–8] 
1.312 (1.048) 
[0–7] 
1.181 (1.360) 
[0–6] 
1.096 (1.239) 
[0–5] 
1.132 (1.216) 
[0–7] 
 phII_tprj 9.534 (26.60) 
[1–194] 
3.121 (7.266) 
[1–80] 
14.75 (36.56) 
[1–223] 
8.230 (18.77) 
[1–117] 
5.5 (12.78) [1–
91] 
 ln phII_tprj 0.9584 (1.269) 
[0–5.268] 
0.5850 
(0.8102) [0–
4.382] 
1.145 (1.472) 
[0–5.407] 
1.087 (1.227) 
[0–4.762] 
0.7557 (1.104) 
[0–4.511] 
 late_eval 0.1445 
(0.3519) [0/1] 
0.04897 
(0.2161) [0/1] 
0.09032 
(0.2876) [0/1] 
0.1333 
(0.3412) [0/1] 
0.1029 
(0.3050) [0/1] 
 num_svyd 4.112 (6.030) 
[1–31] 
2.196 (2.593) 
[1–27] 
5.258 (7.645) 
[1–31] 
3.274 (4.718) 
[1–27] 
3.015 (3.994) 
[1–27] 
 phII_tsvy 13.98 (27.39) 
[1–127] 
4.812 (10.54) 
[1–120] 
19.86 (35.14) 
[1–127] 
10.33 (21.90) 
[1–120] 
9.397 (19.07) 
[1–120] 
 ln phII_tsvy 1.507 (1.386) 
[0–4.844] 
0.8942 
(0.9715) [0–
4.787] 
1.705 (1.548) 
[0–4.844] 
1.375 (1.234) 
[0–4.787] 
1.148 (1.326) 
[0–4.787] 
 sbir_patents 8.285 (20.94) 
[0–125] 
3.005 (6.606) 
[0–66] 
12.75 (27.08) 
[0–125] 
7.474 (13.22) 
[0–66] 
7.934 (13.64) 
[0–66] 
 sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d 41.11 (31.02) 
[0–100] 
40.80 (36.27) 
[0–100] 
 37.34 (34.67) 
[0–100] 
39.51 (33.78) 
[0–100] 
  Geographic variables 
 ne 0.3127 
(0.4639) [0/1] 
0.3273 
(0.4698) [0/1] 
0.2903 
(0.4554) [0/1] 
0.2889 
(0.4549) [0/1] 
0.3382 
(0.4749) [0/1] 
 south 0.2497 
(0.4331) [0/1] 
0.25 (0.4336) 
[0/1] 
0.2323 
(0.4236) [0/1] 
0.1630 
(0.3707) [0/1] 
0.1618 
(0.3696) [0/1] 
 midwest 0.1196 
(0.3247) [0/1] 
0.1856 
(0.3893) [0/1] 
0.09677 
(0.2966) [0/1] 
0.1407 
(0.3490) [0/1] 
0.1544 
(0.3627) [0/1] 
 west 0.3180 
(0.4660) [0/1] 
0.2371 
(0.4259) [0/1] 
0.3806 
(0.4871) [0/1] 
0.4074 
(0.4932) [0/1] 
0.3456 
(0.4773) [0/1] 
Note: For each agency, only the subset of the variables used in the estimation is described. 
Although not the focus of this paper, we draw particular attention to the independent impact of 
outside private investments on the probability of commercial success. Link and Scott (2009) 
argued that the presence of outside investment funding should be positively correlated with such 
success for at least three reasons. One reason is that outside private investors have useful 
information about the commercial prospects of the output of a Phase II project and they signal 
that information by investing in the projects that are likely to be the most successful.26 A second 
reason is that the presence of outside private investors provides useful business and management 
guidance to small (and often newly formed) firms. Finally, firms that have undertaken an internal 
assessment of a project's commercial potential, and thus believe that their project will be 
successful, may be able to identify appropriate outside private investors more easily than other 
firms. 
 
Two econometric issues relate to the estimation of the probability of commercialization. The first 
issue is sample selection and the second issue is potential endogeneity. 
 
Given the data reduction process summarized in Table 2, we cannot assume that error in the 
model of response to the NRC survey is uncorrelated with the error in the model of 
commercialization. We therefore estimate the commercialization models with control for 
selection into the samples by response. Although we do not offer a formal theory for the 
probability of response to the project survey, we do consider what we believe are four intuitive 
variables: ln award_amt, prj_age, num_svyd, and ln phII_tsvy. Simply, firms receiving larger 
awards (award_amt) might be more inclined to respond as a quid pro quo for the greater SBIR 
support. Firms might be less likely to respond to the survey the older the project (prj_age) 
because institutional memory may have faded and would be costly to recover. Firms might be 
less likely to respond to the survey the greater the number of a firm's Phase II projects that were 
surveyed (num_svyd) if a larger reporting burden lowers the probability of response. Yet, such 
firms may be more likely to respond because those having more surveyed projects had received 
more awards and may respond in gratitude. Additionally, the firm's number of previous Phase II 
awards (phII_tsvy) is a proxy for firm size, and larger firms might have the internal resources to 
respond to the survey request. Award amount and previous Phase II awards are measured by 
their natural logarithms to account for any diminishing effects. 
 
Firm revenue (revenue) might be endogenous; error in a model (see Table 5) for 
commercialization success from a Phase II project is not necessarily independent of error in the 
process determining the revenue of the firm. Thus, ln revenue is instrumented because of the 
possibility that the error in the model of the probability of commercialization is not independent 
of the error in firm revenue. When the null hypothesis of exogeneity of ln revenue is rejected, 
instrumental variables are used and listed in the regression output tables. 
Table 5. Estimation strategy. 
Agency Regression model Regression 
results 
Comments 
DoD Probit Table 6 Probit models of commercialization and of sample selection are 
independent; ln revenue is not endogenous 
NIH Probit with 
selection 
Table 7 Probit models of commercialization and of sample selection 
are notindependent; ln revenue is not endogenous 
NASA Probit Table 8 Probit models of commercialization and of sample selection are 
independent; ln revenue is not endogenous 
DOE Probit with 
instrumental 
variables 
Table 9 Probit models of ommercialization and of sample selection are 
independent; null hypothesis of exogeneity of ln revenue is rejected 
at the 0.10 level of significance 
NSF Probit with 
instrumental 
variables 
Table 10 Probit models of commercialization and of sample selection are 
independent; null hypothesis of exogeneity of ln revenue is rejected 
at the 0.001 level of significance 
Note: All unreported regression results are available upon request from the authors. 
Table 5 summarizes the results of our consideration of these econometric issues and outlines the 
regression models presented in Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10.27 Observe that 
for each agency, there is a positive correlation, ceteris paribus, between the probability of 
commercial success and some form of outside private investment, as expected based on the 
earlier discussion of the reasons for such a correlation. 
Table 6. Probit regression results for commercialization (dsales) in the DoD sample (n = 761). 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
non-sbir-federal-to-total-investment 0.4088 0.4055 
U.S.-private-venture-capital-to-total-investment 0.9734* 0.5528 
foreign-private-venture-capital-to-total-investment −1.325 1.673 
other-private-equity-investment-to-total-investment 2.358**** 0.7058 
other-domestic-private-firm-investment-to-total-investment 2.305*** 0.7822 
state-or-local-government-funding-to-total-investment −0.7015 2.620 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
college-or-universities-funding-to-total-investment −2.578 1.792 
own-firm-funding-to-total-investment 1.763*** 0.5733 
personal-funds-to-total-investment −1.448 1.585 
prj_age 0.06810*** 0.02323 
ln reltd_phII 0.1410 0.1213 
nocom 2.640**** 0.4287 
software 1.577**** 0.2016 
hardware 1.275**** 0.1558 
process 0.4820** 0.1997 
service 0.9030**** 0.2379 
research 0.5799** 0.2649 
education 0.9726 0.6992 
other 0.5855* 0.3540 
ln revenue 0.1474**** 0.04294 
sbir_fnd 0.2403 0.1686 
business_fndrs −0.1216* 0.07008 
academic_fndrs −0.08321 0.05292 
ln phII_tprj −0.09938* 0.05128 
late_eval −0.2164 0.2149 
ne 0.02616 0.1649 
south −0.03267 0.1996 
midwest 0.04160 0.2647 
constant −4.109**** 0.6784 
 Wald chi2 (df) 244.6 (28)****  
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
Pseudo R2 0.4184  
Log pseudo-likelihood −304.9  
Note: Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights). Standard errors are robust and are adjusted for clusters 
by firm because for some firms multiple Phase II SBIR projects are sampled. The clustering allows for intra-group correlation in 
the errors for the multiple projects of a firm. 
* Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.10. 
** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.05. 
*** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.01. 
**** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.001. 
Table 7. Probit regression results with sample selection for commercialization (dsales) in the 
NIH sample (n = 382). 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
non-sbir-federal-to-total-investment 1.098 0.9097 
U.S.-private-venture-capital-to-total-investment 1.965** 0.8242 
foreign-private-venture-capital-to-total-investment −1.984 1.628 
other-private-equity-investment-to-total-investment −0.1334 0.8146 
other-domestic-private-firm-investment-to-total-investment 0.7892 0.6513 
state-or-local-government-funding-to-total-investment 3.178** 1.622 
college-or-universities-funding-to-total-investment −40.30** 17.03 
own-firm-funding-to-total-investment 1.339** 0.5981 
personal-funds-to-total-investment 2.120** 1.071 
prj_age 0.03420 0.03137 
ln reltd_phII 0.2125** 0.1062 
nocom 0.8615 0.5437 
software 0.7293**** 0.223 
hardware 0.6552*** 0.2234 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
process 0.4117 0.2765 
service −0.2740 0.3007 
biologic 0.4135 0.3495 
research 0.6455*** 0.2400 
education 1.236**** 0.3375 
other 0.2987 0.3467 
ln revenue 0.09647** 0.04032 
sbir_fnd 0.0000903 0.1733 
business_fndrs 0.1344 0.1177 
academic_fndrs −0.1184 0.08378 
ln phII_tprj 0.03611 0.09639 
late_eval −0.05997 0.3298 
ne 0.05840 0.2154 
south 0.2634 0.2372 
midwest 0.05805 0.2344 
constant −3.399**** 0.6298 
 Selection 
 ln award_amt 0.1350 0.09104 
 prj_age −0.04174*** 0.01429 
 num_svyd 0.002032 0.05387 
 ln phII_tsvy 0.1900** 0.09243 
 constant −2.321* 1.212 
 Rho 0.5388* 0.2358 
Wald chi2 (df) 58.16 (29)****  
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
Log pseudo-likelihood −1608.0  
Wald chi-squared (1) test of independent equations (rho = 0) 3.29*  
Notes: 
drugs (n = 6) predicted perfectly and was thus dropped. 
The model is estimated with 1564 observations including 1182 censored observations and 382 uncensored observations. There 
are 495 Phase II projects reporting dsales, but only 388 of those report all of the explanatory variables in the model. Thus, there 
are potentially 388 uncensored observations. There are 1677 Phase II projects for which we have the explanatory variables for the 
model of response, but 495 − 388 of those report dsales but are missing some of the explanatory variables for the 
commercialization model. Thus there are 1677 − (495 − 388) = 1570 total observations that could be used in the model − 388 
uncensored observations and 1677 − (495 − 388) − 388 = 1182 censored observations. However, for six observations a variable 
predicted success perfectly and they are therefore not used in the model, leaving 1564 total observations with 1182 censored and 
382 uncensored. The 495 − 388 = 107 observations reporting dsales are not really censored with regard to the variable being 
studied and are omitted from the estimation of the model with control for selection. 
Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights). Standard errors are robust and are adjusted for clusters by 
firm because for some firms multiple Phase II SBIR projects are sampled. The clustering allows for intra-group correlation in the 
errors for the multiple projects of a firm. The significance level for the parameter rho is the significance level for the estimated 
coefficient (not shown) from which rho is derived. 
* Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.10. 
** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.05. 
*** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.01. 
**** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.001. 
Table 8. Probit regression results for commercialization (dsales) in the NASA sample (n = 155). 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
non-sbir-federal-to-total-investment 3.859*** 1.289 
other-private-equity-investment-to-total-investment 9.831** 4.174 
other-domestic-private-firm-investment-to-total-investment 3.686* 1.904 
own-firm-funding-to-total-investment 0.4807 0.7869 
personal-funds-to-total-investment −4.484 5.106 
prj_age 0.02704 0.0526 
ln reltd_phII −0.08835 0.2906 
software 2.482**** 0.6148 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
hardware 2.114**** 0.3141 
process 0.4259 0.4726 
service −0.2158 0.6645 
research 1.175* 0.6806 
education 0.9786 0.7455 
other 2.004* 1.059 
ln revenue 0.1034 0.08818 
sbir_fnd 0.9628*** 0.3309 
business_fndrs 0.2979** 0.1188 
academic_fndrs −0.08957 0.1206 
ln phII_tprj −0.02109 0.08497 
late_eval 0.3172 0.3895 
ne 0.5829 0.3668 
south 0.03610 0.4544 
midwest 0.01384 0.6035 
constant −4.183*** 1.580 
 Wald chi2 (df) 148.4 (23)****  
Pseudo R2 0.5536  
Log pseudo-likelihood −47.74  
Note: Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights). Standard errors are robust and are adjusted for clusters 
by firm because for some firms multiple Phase II SBIR projects are sampled. The clustering allows for intra-group correlation in 
the errors for the multiple projects of a firm. 
* Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.10. 
** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.05. 
*** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.01. 
**** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.001. 
Table 9. Probit regression results for commercialization (dsales) in the DOE sample (n = 131). 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
ln revenue 0.4785** 0.2146 
non-sbir-federal-to-total-investment 1.571 1.138 
foreign-private-venture-capital-to-total-investment −0.03780 1.330 
other-private-equity-investment-to-total-investment 0.7495 1.545 
other-domestic-private-firm-investment-to-total-investment 4.739**** 1.338 
state-or-local-government-funding-to-total-investment −27.47*** 9.314 
own-firm-funding-to-total-investment 1.579* 0.8401 
personal-funds-to-total-investment 28.14*** 10.21 
prj_age −0.0002769 0.04573 
ln reltd_phII −0.009011 0.2437 
software 1.245** 0.5557 
hardware 1.202**** 0.3777 
process 0.9083** 0.3787 
service −0.2543 0.5454 
research 0.9143 0.5938 
other 1.554** 0.6178 
sbir_fnd 0.1545 0.3814 
business_fndrs 0.04665 0.1445 
academic_fndrs −0.3446** 0.1524 
ln phII_tprj −0.3243** 0.1606 
late_eval −0.8608* 0.4563 
ne 0.2654 0.3676 
south 0.1941 0.3694 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
midwest −0.7210 0.5167 
constant −7.869*** 2.853 
 Rho −0.6111* 0.2704 
Sigma 1.158* 0.09535 
Wald chi2 (df) 205.1 (24)****  
Wald test of exogeneity chi-squared (1) 2.71*  
Log pseudo-likelihood −503.2  
Notes: 
education (n = 4) predicted perfectly and was thus dropped. 
Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights). Standard errors are robust and are adjusted for clusters by 
firm because for some firms multiple Phase II SBIR projects are sampled. The clustering allows for intra-group correlation in the 
errors for the multiple projects of a firm. 
Sigma is the estimate of the standard deviation of the error in the reduced form equation for ln revenue, and rho is the estimate of 
the correlation between that error and the error in the probit model. The significance levels for the parameters rho and sigma are 
the significance levels for the estimated coefficients (not shown) from which rho and sigma are derived. 
Instrumented: ln revenue. 
Instruments: non-sbir-federal-to-total-investment, foreign-private-investment-to-total-investment, other-private-equity-
investment-to-total-investment, other-domestic-private-firm-investment-to-total-investment, state-or-local-government-funding-
to-total-investment,own-firm-funding-to-total-investment, personal-funds-to-total-investment, prj_age, 
ln reltd_phII, software, hardware, process,service, research, other, sbir_fnd, business_fndrs, academic_fndrs, 
ln phII_tprj, late_eval, ne, south, midwest, prior_sbir_fndg,prior_ventcap, prior_univ_fndg, prior_nonsbir_fed, priorother_priv, 
prior_priv_inv, prior_intrnl_co, prior_stateorlocal, prior_other,sbir_patents, sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d. 
* Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.10. 
** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.05. 
*** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.01. 
**** Significance level (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.001. 
Table 10. Probit regression results for commercialization (dsales) in the NSF sample (n = 123). 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
ln revenue −0.5377**** 0.1276 
non-sbir-federal-to-total-investment 1.400 1.001 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
U.S.-private-venture-capital-to-total-investment −0.6896 1.748 
other-private-equity-investment-to-total-investment 1.497** 0.6360 
other-domestic-private-firm-investment-to-total-investment 1.290* 0.6893 
state-or-local-government-funding-to-total-investment −1.144 1.714 
own-firm-funding-to-total-investment 2.790** 1.255 
personal-funds-to-total-investment −1.004 2.203 
prj_age −0.005479 0.04834 
ln reltd_phII 0.2736 0.2595 
software 2.233*** 0.7226 
hardware 1.321*** 0.4919 
process 0.6202* 0.3470 
service 0.07500 0.3939 
research −0.5710 0.3846 
other −0.6659* 0.3756 
sbir_fnd 0.5565 0.3617 
business_fndrs 0.4786*** 0.1836 
academic_fndrs 0.1706 0.1291 
ln phII_tprj 0.6452**** 0.1264 
late_eval −0.9800** 0.4342 
ne −0.4062 0.4271 
south −0.01436 0.4678 
midwest 0.1892 0.4360 
constant 5.193** 2.235 
 Rho 0.9005**** 0.08168 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
Sigma 1.203*** 0.08686 
Wald chi2 (df) 250.9 (24)****  
Wald test of exogeneity chi-squared (1) 11.67****  
Log pseudo-likelihood −410.8  
Notes: 
education (n = 13) predicted perfectly and was thus dropped. 
Estimation with probability weights (also called sampling weights). Standard errors are robust and are adjusted for clusters by 
firm because for some firms multiple Phase II SBIR projects are sampled. The clustering allows for intra-group correlation in the 
errors for the multiple projects of a firm. 
Sigma is the estimate of the standard deviation of the error in the reduced form equation for ln revenue, and rho is the estimate of 
the correlation between that error and the error in the probit model. The significance levels for the parameters rho and sigma are 
the significance levels for the estimated coefficients (not shown) from which rho and sigma are derived. 
Instrumented: ln revenue. 
Instruments: non-sbir-federal-to-total-investment, foreign-private-investment-to-total-investment, other-private-equity-
investment-to-total-investment, other-domestic-private-firm-investment-to-total-investment, state-or-local-government-funding-
to-total-investment,own-firm-funding-to-total-investment, personal-funds-to-total-investment, prj_age, 
ln reltd_phII, software, hardware, process,service, research, other, sbir_fnd, business_fndrs, academic_fndrs, 
ln phII_tprj, late_eval, ne, south, midwest, prior_sbir_fndg,prior_ventcap, prior_univ_fndg, prior_nonsbir_fed, prior_other_priv,
 prior_priv_inv, prior_intrnl_co, prior_stateorlocal, prior_other,sbir_patents, sbir-r&d-to-total-r&d. 
* Significance levels (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.10. 
** Significance levels (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.05. 
*** Significance levels (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.01. 
**** Significance levels (two tails excepting chi-squared): 0.001. 
Relevant to the purpose of the paper, Table 11 presents the predicted probability of commercial 
success from the relevant regression results. Because there are several dichotomous explanatory 
variables, given the probit index's nonlinear impact on predicted probabilities, it is best not to 
make the predictions with the independent variables evaluated at their means. Instead, the 
probability predicted for each agency is the average of the probabilities predicted for each of its 
sampled SBIR projects with the variables set at their actual values for each project. In all cases, 
the predicted average probability of commercialization is somewhat less than 0.50, the 
probability of heads on the toss of a fair coin. For the NIH sample where selection was 
important, the predicted probability of commercialization conditional on response is essentially 
one-half, but the predicted probability based only on the characteristics of the observations, 
excluding the effect because of the correlation in the errors of the response and 
commercialization models, is somewhat less than one-third. Importantly, the evidence also 
shows large variation in the probability of commercialization—the predicted probability of 
commercialization ranges across the projects from essentially zero to essentially 1.0. 
Table 11. Predicted probability of commercialization. 
Agency n Mean predicted probability of 
commercialization 
S.D. Minimum Maximum 
DoD 761 0.4480 0.3430 0.00926 1.000 
 NIH 382 0.3094 0.2556 0.004762 0.9949 
 Conditional on 
selection 
382 0.4957 0.2967 0.01889 1.000 
 NASA 155 0.4679 0.3901 0.0005967 1.000 
DOE 131 0.4928 0.3457 0.000702 1.000 
NSF 123 0.4791 0.3514 0.0000406 1.000 
Note: Observe the effect of selection in the NIH sample—the only one where selection was important for the commercialization 
model. The probability of success conditional on response is predicted to be 0.50, but is only 0.31 for the marginal probability 
given the characteristics for the observations apart from the fact that they responded. 
Thus, the evidence in Table 11 quantifies the uncertainty that government accepts in the context 
of innovation supported by the SBIR program; or stated alternatively, Table 11 quantifies the 
probability that a project funded by the SBIR program will fail to commercialize its results. The 
results show that the entrepreneurial risk that characterizes the SBIR program is on average 
slightly more than the probability of failing to get heads on the toss of a fair coin. The shaded 
area in Fig. 2 shows the a priori probability that an accepted SBIR project's rate of return will fall 
below the private hurdle rate. After studying our samples of projects, at the time the 
commercialization decision is made that probability is on average apparently at least somewhat 
more than 0.5. 
 
6. Conclusions 
As Hébert and Link (2009, p. xvii) note: 
 
The historical economics literature gives no fewer than 12 identities to the entrepreneur: 
 
1. The entrepreneur is the person who assumes the risk associated with uncertainty. 
2. The entrepreneur is the person who supplies financial capital. 
3. The entrepreneur is an innovator. 
4. The entrepreneur is a decision-maker. 
5. The entrepreneur is an industrial leader. 
6. The entrepreneur is a manager or superintendent. 
7. The entrepreneur is an organizer and coordinator of economic resources. 
8. The entrepreneur is the owner of an enterprise. 
9. The entrepreneur is an employer of factors of production. 
10. The entrepreneur is a contractor. 
11. The entrepreneur is an arbitrageur. 
12. The entrepreneur is an allocator of resources among alternative uses. 
In this paper we have emphasized the first and the third concepts of the entrepreneur as we 
posited a definition of government as entrepreneur. Of course, there are additional clear overlaps 
between the observed roles of government and the historical characterizations of the 
entrepreneur. In the SBIR program, government provides financial capital, is a decision-maker, 
is an organizer and coordinator of economic resources, and is an allocator of resources among 
alternative uses. Moreover, in many cases the government is a contractor, purchasing the 
commercial product or service that results from the SBIR research. Our conceptualizing of 
government as entrepreneur relates to its provision of technology infrastructure when its 
involvement is both innovative and characterized by entrepreneurial risk, and in the SBIR 
program, the government is redirecting R&D resources toward the development of technologies 
that the market alone would not have developed. In its solicitations of SBIR proposals and 
subsequent funding of awards, the government is organizing, coordinating and allocating scarce 
resources among competing uses. As emphasized in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, the government's role in 
providing financial capital is a key part of its entrepreneurial activity. We have chosen to view 
government activity through an entrepreneurial lens because it is the one that has been 
overlooked by others, for the most part, and because it is the one that is critical to the long-run 
growth of our economy. 
 
Our findings are not generalizable to all small firms engaged in R&D; our findings are specific to 
those small firms doing R&D that was funded through SBIR. Indeed, it might be useful to 
compare the probability of commercialization among non-SBIR supported firms to our findings. 
However, because of the unique nature of research undertaken by SBIR recipient firms, a 
matched-pair sample of reasonable quality may not be possible to construct. 
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